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ABSTRACT—The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) pulls back the curtain 
of sovereign immunity and allows private citizens to directly sue the 
federal government for damages resulting from negligence. Passed in 1946 
and never amended, the statute carries no limit on potential damages, only 
prohibiting punitive damages and jury trials. Other than those procedural 
limitations, the potential liability of the government is unlimited—except 
for one single exception: the discretionary function exception. The 
discretionary function exception shields the government from liability for 
“the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.” 
Congress failed to elaborate on the definition and scope of “discretionary” 
functions and has left this vague exception for the courts to interpret. 
The Supreme Court has used a wide array of terms to describe the 
discretionary function exception and has intermittently revived and 
overruled prior language. The discretionary function exception has 
therefore rested entirely on judicial discretion in practice, changing in 
application based on the whims of the Court without any concrete factors 
on which to rely. This Note proposes that the Court formally adopt a factor-
based standard in interpreting the discretionary function exception, based 
on five factors. By clearly articulating these factors, the Court can prevent 
future courts from abusing their discretion in applying the exception. This 
is especially important considering that such abuse could leave the 
government either largely immune from the consequences of its actions or 
open to crippling liability at every turn. The Federal Tort Claims Act was a 
pivotal step forward in solving this problem in 1946; clarifying the 
discretionary function exception today will be another crucial milestone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has enjoyed full sovereign immunity for much of its 
existence, during which time private citizens could not sue the federal 
government.1 This changed in 1946 when Congress passed the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA), which allowed private citizens to sue the federal 
government for tort damages. The text of the FTCA operated as a limited 
waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing citizens to sue the government “in 
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances.”2 In the seventy years since Congress passed the FTCA, the 
courts’ imprecise and meandering interpretations of the statute have caused 
no small amount of trouble. 
This Note considers the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. The 
discretionary function exception exempts the government from liability for 
“the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the 
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not 
 
 1 See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (“The United States, as sovereign, 
is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . .”); United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 
(1878) (“[The United States] cannot be sued without their consent.”). See generally Joseph D. Block, 
Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060 
(1946) (discussing the history of sovereign immunity in the United States). 
 2 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012). 
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the discretion involved [can] be abused.”3 In other words, the government 
cannot be sued if it is performing a “discretionary” function. The word 
“discretionary” does not appear anywhere else in the text of the statute; this 
requires the courts to define exactly what constitutes a “discretionary 
function or duty.” The language of the statute’s discretionary function 
exception has remained surprisingly unchanged to the present day. This 
legislative silence is not helpful in clarifying the scope of the discretionary 
function exception.4 
The Supreme Court has interpreted and reinterpreted the discretionary 
function exception since 1946, yet it has failed to provide a consistent 
standard.5 Since the core purpose of the Act is to provide an avenue for 
private citizens to seek recourse against the federal government, this vague 
exception to the FTCA poses a continuing risk of swallowing the rule 
entirely and shielding the government from all forms of liability. This 
would take all of the bite out of the Act. Moreover, the stakes are high: 
courts are balancing an important private right to sue the government for 
tort damages against an equally important sovereign immunity protecting 
vital government operations. With that much at stake, consistent and 
prudential judicial decisionmaking requires more concrete guidance than 
the Court’s interpretations of “discretionary” to date. Thus, the Supreme 
Court should clarify the scope of the discretionary function exception by 
articulating a factor-based standard that draws from its prior precedent. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the FTCA’s text and 
legislative history. Part II then summarizes shifting judicial interpretations 
of the exception. Next, Part III examines the quixotic seven-decade attempt 
by scholarly literature to either delineate the meaning of the discretionary 
function exception or cure the exception’s inherent ambiguity. Lastly, Part 
IV proposes a five-factor standard for the discretionary function exception 
that includes (1) whether the government employee exercised a choice, (2) 
whether the choice related to policy considerations, (3) whether the 
government employee’s conduct, if performed by a private person, would 
violate state law, (4) practical concerns over inhibiting essential 
government functioning, and (5) a desire to minimize sovereign immunity 
and allow private citizens to sue the government for wrongful or negligent 
 
 3 Id. § 2680(a). 
 4 This is partly because statutory silence can be interpreted in various ways. See, e.g., YULE KIM, 
CONG. RES. SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 
16 (2008) (describing different possible interpretations of statutory silence). 
 5 See, e.g., Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (describing the courts’ failure 
to define the discretionary function exception); see also United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea 
Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984) (claiming it is impossible to fully define the 
discretionary function exception). 
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acts by its agents, officers, or employees. This standard provides a sturdy 
framework for future judicial application by combining the wisdom and 
consistency of precedent with cabining the exception to ensure that it does 
not swallow the rule. 
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 
The FTCA was born from a combination of a longstanding need to 
reform a burdensome private bill system and a freak accident on July 28, 
1945, which began as a foggy Saturday morning in New York City. Shortly 
before 10:00 AM, a U.S. Army pilot flying a routine transport mission in a 
B-25 bomber ignored a low-visibility warning from air traffic control and 
flew the plane straight into the Empire State Building.6 The accident killed 
fourteen people and caused damage estimated at $1 million ($13 million 
adjusted for inflation7).8 Following the accident, the U.S. government 
offered reparations to the victims’ families; some, but not all, families 
accepted.9 In the same year, Congress hastened to pass the landmark 
FTCA, giving ordinary citizens (such as the remaining victims’ families) 
the ability to file a lawsuit against the federal government.10 
Versions of the FTCA that would pull back the curtain of sovereign 
immunity had been languishing in Congress for twenty years.11 For 
example, Congress debated the first seedling of the FTCA on February 5, 
1925; this debated bill, House Bill 12,179, sought to replace the 
burdensome existing private bill system in which Congress voted on 
individual small claims.12 It proposed to instead “create a ‘cause of action 
for compensation in damages for injuries sustained and death resulting 
from injuries to any person through the wrongful act or omission by an 
 
 6 Jennifer Latson, When an Army Plane Crashed into the Empire State Building, TIME (July 28, 
2015), http://time.com/3967660/army-pilot-crash-empire-state-building [https://perma.cc/7EMD-
S5VU]. 
 7 To determine this amount, an inflation calculator was used. See Inflation Calculator, 
DOLLARTIMES, http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm [http://perma.cc/9L2N-DC2S]. 
 8 Empire State Building Withstood Airplane Impact, JOM (Dec. 2001), 
http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/0112/News/News8-0112.html [https://perma.cc/3ZZX-X78K] 
(monthly publication of The Minerals, Metals & Materials Society). 
 9 Joe Richman, The Day a Bomber Hit the Empire State Building, NPR (July 28, 2008), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92987873 [https://perma.cc/ZXZ9-YL4C]. 
 10 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012) (“The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”). 
 11 See Donald N. Zillman, Congress, Courts and Government Tort Liability: Reflections on the 
Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 687, 699–700 
(describing the debate over the 1925 Public Vessels Act as an “ambitious rejection of sovereign 
immunity in torts”). 
 12 Id. 
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agent, officer, or employee of the United States government and to provide 
the procedure therefor.’”13 This bill would have shifted the responsibility 
for determining compensation for private victims of government 
negligence from Congress to the courts, providing a judicial check on 
sovereign immunity.14 The bill died in committee,15 but it spawned over 
thirty proposed bills in the following years,16 culminating in the passage of 
the FTCA. 
Congressional debates in this period weighed the arbitrary17 and 
burdensome18 existing private bill system with practical19 and precedential 
concerns20 in allowing citizens to directly sue the government. The 
discretionary function exception was meant to address the latter pair of 
concerns, as Assistant Attorney General Francis Shea described at a 
hearing on January 29, 1942: 
[The discretionary function exception] is a highly important exception, 
designed to avoid any possibility that the act may be construed to authorize 
damage suits against the government growing out of legally authorized 
activity, such as a flood-control or irrigation project . . . . It is neither 
desirable nor intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the legality of 
regulation, or the propriety of a discretionary administrative act should be 
tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort.21 
While the FTCA originated with Congress’s desire to at least slightly 
draw back the curtain of sovereign immunity, the discretionary function 
exception kept the curtain in place to protect certain essential government 
 
 13 Id. at 700 (quoting 66 CONG. REC. 3090 (1925)). 
 14 Id. (“Claims could be handled administratively by an executive branch agency or by a court.”). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 700 n.84 (citing 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 59, at 2-54 to -67 
(1989)). 
 17 For example, Representative Underhill noted that under the existing private bill system, “one 
objecting Member of the House can strike the bill off the calendar and he need give no reason therefor. 
He may not like the Member who introduced the bill because he wears a red necktie.” 67 CONG. REC. 
10034 (1926). 
 18 Representative Stafford, for instance, wondered, “Why should Congress be concerned with these 
little petty claims . . . . We want to be relieved of this distasteful and most disagreeable work.” 
76 CONG. REC. 4836 (1933). His question was followed by applause. Id. 
 19 Representative Ramseyer in particular was concerned with the prospect of the government being 
liable for “billions of dollars, which might threaten the life of the sovereign and the very existence of 
the government.” Zillman, supra note 11, at 702 n.94. 
 20 On this issue, Attorney General Sargent wrote that “any acknowledgement by the Government of 
liability for torts is a dangerous precedent and a radical departure from the long-established principles 
of our law and Government.” 67 CONG. REC. 5688 (1926). 
 21 Zillman, supra note 11, at 706–07, 707 n.119 (emphasis added) (quoting Tort Claims: Hearings 
on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 28 (1942) 
(statement of Francis Shea, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States)). 
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functions.22 Other provisions of the FTCA reflected this protective intent: 
for example, neither jury trials nor punitive damages were permitted 
against the government,23 and Congress mandated a one-year statute of 
limitations.24 But the broad language of the discretionary function exception 
largely served as the primary mechanism to protect vital functions of 
government from a potential cascade of private litigation. In both the 
legislative history and the text of the statute, Congress avoided discussing 
the nuances of the term “discretionary,” leading to continuously shifting 
judicial interpretations that persist today.25 
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION TEST 
OVER THE YEARS 
The Supreme Court attempted to define the discretionary function 
exception in myriad ways in the seventy years after the FTCA was passed. 
Unfortunately, the oft-conflicting judicial interpretations only added to the 
initial confusion over how to apply the exception. 
A. Early Interpretations 
The Court interpreted the FTCA in Dalehite v. United States,26 which 
followed the Texas City disaster in 1947 in which 2,300 tons of fertilizer 
stored aboard a French cargo ship exploded and killed over 581 people.27 
Families of the victims filed hundreds of lawsuits against the government 
alleging negligence under the FTCA, totaling over $200 million in personal 
and property claims (over $2.2 billion adjusted for inflation28).29 The 
Supreme Court ultimately interpreted the discretionary function exception 
as protecting the government from liability for alleged negligent acts and 
omissions in storing the fertilizer on the cargo ship.30 
The majority stated that “[w]here there is room for policy judgment 
and decision there is discretion,” and that “acts of subordinates in carrying 
 
 22 See id. at 711. 
 23 See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 410, 60 Stat. 842, 843–44 (1946) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 24 See id. § 420, 60 Stat. at 845. 
 25 See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 845 F.3d 123, 128–29 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining the current 
messy state of the discretionary function exception). 
 26 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
 27 Texas City, Texas, Disaster, FIRE PREVENTION & ENG’G BUREAU OF TEX. (Apr. 29, 1947), 
http://www.local1259iaff.org/report.htm [https://perma.cc/Z7X2-PHUN]. 
 28 Again, an inflation calculator was used to determine this amount. See Inflation Calculator, supra 
note 7. 
 29 Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 17. 
 30 Id. at 41 (“In short, the alleged ‘negligence’ does not subject the Government to liability.”). 
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out the operations of government in accordance with official directions 
cannot be actionable.”31 The Court also opined that any alleged government 
negligence because of its safety standards was a result of decisions 
“responsibly made in the exercise of judgment at a planning, rather than an 
operational level,”32 and it “refused to question the judgments on which 
they are based.”33 These distinctions concerning the status of the actor and 
planning versus operational decisions were the first examples of the Court 
creating its own language to interpret the discretionary function exception.34 
The Dalehite Court’s inventive language hid the pragmatic and 
constitutional concerns underlying the Court’s strong deference to the 
government’s activities, of which there are at least two. First, a $2.2 billion 
award was exceptionally large, and the Court was likely hesitant to impose 
such a heavy burden on the government.35 Second, constitutionally 
imposing liability on the government’s activities would have essentially 
substituted the appointed Court’s policy judgments for those of elected 
legislators, raising separation of powers concerns because the Court would 
then arguably be instructing the government how to allocate its resources.36 
It is unclear why the Court did not simply explain these real practical and 
constitutional concerns upfront, rather than couch them in artificial 
distinctions between the status of the actor and operational versus planning 
decisions. Dalehite began a trend in which the Court relied upon these 
practical and constitutional concerns without explicitly saying so. 
Two years after the Dalehite decision, the Court again addressed the 
discretionary function exception when the Indian Towing Company sued 
the government for the Coast Guard’s allegedly negligent maintenance of a 
 
 31 Id. at 36. 
 32 Id. at 42. 
 33 Id. at 43. 
 34 The Court later rejected both distinctions. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325–
26 (1991) (“Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level . . . . There [is] no 
suggestion that decisions made at an operational level could not also be based on policy.”); United 
States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984) 
(“[I]t is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the 
discretionary function exception applies . . . .”). 
 35 Indeed, the dissent noted this latent concern. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 54 (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (“It is obvious that the Court’s only choice is to hold the Government’s liability to be 
nothing or to be very heavy, indeed.”). 
 36 Id. at 43 (“The power to adopt regulations or by-laws . . . are generally regarded as discretionary, 
because, in their nature, they are legislative.” (quoting Weightman v. Corp. of Wash., 66 U.S. (1 Black) 
39, 49 (1861))). Fortunately, both the practical and constitutional concerns in Dalehite were later 
avoided when Congress provided nearly $17 million in compensation for the victims through 
legislation. See MELVIN M. BELLI, “READY FOR THE PLAINTIFF!” 83–85 (1965) (discussing the passing 
of “special acts” under the Federal Torts Claims Act to compensate the victims). 
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lighthouse that caused cargo damage.37 The Court, drawing on Dalehite’s 
operational versus planning distinction, held that this negligence involved 
the operational level of government, not the planning level; it thus found 
the government liable for damages under the FTCA.38 Notably, this case 
only involved damages of $62,659.70 ($566,593.88 adjusted for 
inflation39),40 so the practical concerns of holding the government liable 
were not as serious as in Dalehite, where the claim was worth $2.2 billion.41 
Similarly, the constitutional separation of powers concerns were not as 
prevalent in this case, as it involved routine maintenance.42 Thus, the 
lurking practical and constitutional concerns that seemingly persuaded the 
Court not to find liability in Dalehite were weaker in Indian Towing Co. 
The Indian Towing Co. Court consequently cabined the discretionary 
function exception for the first time. The government argued that because 
the FTCA allowed for governmental liability “in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a private individual,”43 the government could not then be 
liable for “uniquely governmental” activities like the Coast Guard’s 
maintenance of a lighthouse for which private individuals could not be 
liable.44 The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that it would be 
“bizarre” to find government liability based on whether private individuals 
would be liable because the nature of the government’s activity would be 
the same regardless.45 Further, the Court reasoned that if the government 
eventually allowed private operation of lighthouses (which it eventually 
did46), the “uniquely governmental” distinction would disappear and the 
alleged negligence would become actionable, even though the action itself 
had not changed.47 
Then, two years after the Court limited the exception in Indian Towing 
Co., the Court again revisited the discretionary function exception. 
Rayonier, Inc., sued the government under the FTCA for its alleged 
 
 37 See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 61 (1955). 
 38 Id. at 64. 
 39 An inflation calculator was again used to calculate this figure. See Inflation Calculator, supra 
note 7. 
 40 Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 62. 
 41 See supra text accompanying notes 28–29. 
 42 See Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 69 (“The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse 
service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light . . . and engendered reliance . . . it was 
obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order . . . .”). 
 43 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012). 
 44 Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 64. 
 45 Id. at 67. 
 46 The National Historic Lighthouse Preservation Act of 2000 (NHLPA) created a process for 
transferring ownership of federal lighthouses to private owners. See 54 U.S.C. §§ 305101–06 (2012). 
 47 Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 66. 
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negligence in failing to timely extinguish a fire, which eventually spread 
and damaged Rayonier’s property.48 The Court concluded that the 
government could be liable if Washington law would impose liability “on 
private persons or corporations under similar circumstances.”49 In other 
words, the Court considered how state law would apply to determine 
government liability under the FTCA. The Court justified this liability on 
the basis of loss spreading, reasoning that when everyone benefits from 
government activities, it is unfair to leave people to fend for themselves 
when they are injured by such activities rather than holding the government 
accountable.50 This reasoning illuminates another lurking practical concern: 
whether loss spreading is fair and will help the afflicted parties.51 
Lower court decisions emulated this type of ad hoc interpretation of 
the discretionary function exception, deliberately avoiding articulating a 
more exacting definition. In fact, courts recognized the futility of trying to 
define the exception. For example, in Payton v. United States,52 an FTCA 
lawsuit against the federal government involving a federal prisoner who 
killed three people after being released, the Fifth Circuit opined: 
The drafters of the Act . . . failed to define the term “discretionary function.” 
This omission is understandable in light of the fact that the courts have 
struggled for nearly three decades to provide such a definition, with limited 
success. We will not pretend to succeed where our predecessors for thirty 
years have failed in providing succinct definition of the term.53 
This was a rare upfront acknowledgement that the courts had failed to 
provide a more precise definition of the discretionary function exception. 
So when it came to the defining the right of citizens to sue the government, 
the Fifth Circuit was limited to ever-evolving and increasingly convoluted 
precedent.54 
 
 48 Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 316–17 (1957). 
 49 Id. at 318. 
 50 See id. at 320 (“Congress was aware that when losses caused by such negligence are charged 
against the public treasury they are in effect spread among all those who contribute financially to the 
support of the Government and the resulting burden on each taxpayer is relatively slight. But when the 
entire burden falls on the injured party it may leave him destitute or grievously harmed.”). 
 51 Notably, the Court also cited Indian Towing Co. in rejecting immunity for “uniquely 
governmental” activities like firefighters’ conduct. Id. at 319 (“[A]n injured party cannot be deprived of 
his rights under the [FTCA] by resort to an alleged distinction . . . between the Government’s 
negligence when it acts in a ‘proprietary’ capacity and its negligence when it acts in a ‘uniquely 
governmental’ capacity.”). 
 52 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 53 Id. at 479 (emphasis added). 
 54 See id. (“We will, however, review the guidelines presented by prior decisions and apply them to 
the facts before us.”). 
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B. Toward a Pragmatic Approach 
The next major development in Supreme Court jurisprudence came in 
the 1984 case of United States v. Varig Airlines.55 Varig Airlines sued the 
government for the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) allegedly 
negligent “spot check” program after passengers on a Varig Airlines 
airplane certified by that agency were killed because of a fire in its 
bathroom trash bin.56 The Supreme Court was remarkably transparent in its 
opinion, beginning with the admission that “it is unnecessary—and indeed 
impossible—to define with precision every contour of the discretionary 
function exception.”57 Ultimately, the Court found that the FAA 
employees’ actions in performing spot checks were protected by the 
discretionary function exception.58 
The Court explicitly justified its decision in Varig on the basis of the 
same lurking constitutional and practical concerns from Dalehite. First, on 
a constitutional level, the Court emphasized the goal of preventing “judicial 
‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in 
social, economic, and political policy.”59 This statement mirrored dicta in 
Dalehite, in which the Court “refused to question the judgments on which 
[policy decisions] are based.”60 Second, on a practical level, the Court noted 
the discretionary function exception’s purpose in “protect[ing] the 
Government from liability that would seriously handicap efficient 
government operations.”61 Hence, the Court had appeared to turn the corner 
in openly discussing the broader practical and constitutional concerns 
motivating its application of the discretionary function exception. 
Such transparency did not come without cost; the Court broke with 
prior precedent in Varig. For example, the Varig Court necessarily had to 
break with Dalehite’s artificial distinction regarding the actor’s status.62 
The Court in Varig underscored that “it is the nature of the conduct, rather 
than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function 
exception applies in a given case.”63 This statement directly rejected the 
Court’s language in Dalehite, which claimed the “acts of subordinates in 
carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official 
 
 55 467 U.S. 797 (1984). 
 56 Id. at 797. 
 57 Id. at 813. 
 58 Id. at 821. 
 59 Id. at 814. 
 60 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 43 (1953). 
 61 Varig, 467 U.S. at 814 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963)). 
 62 For more on Dalehite’s distinction, see supra text accompanying notes 31–34. 
 63 Varig, 467 U.S. at 813 (emphasis added). 
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directions cannot be actionable,”64 as the status of the government 
employee as a subordinate or a supervisor was no longer relevant to the 
discretionary function analysis. The Court in Varig also broke from Indian 
Towing Co.’s artificial distinction of operational activities. In Indian 
Towing Co., the Court refused to apply the discretionary function exception 
to protect “operational” activities such as routine lighthouse maintenance.65 
However, in Varig, the Court applied the discretionary function exception 
to protect “efficient government operations,” such as routine airplane spot 
checks.66 
At this point, the FTCA’s discretionary function exception had 
become a muddled and contradictory standard, with the Supreme Court 
openly rejecting its prior distinctions while still refusing to provide a 
precise definition. The Court had further confused things by adding more 
tests to rationalize certain outcomes, such as employing state-law-derived 
liability to justify loss spreading (as in Rayonier67) or using the 
discretionary function exception to protect efficient government 
functioning (as in Varig68). 
C. More Confusion 
Four years after Varig, the Court added more layers to the 
discretionary function exception in an FTCA suit filed on behalf of a three-
month-old boy, Kevin Berkovitz, who contracted polio after receiving a 
government-approved polio vaccine.69 The Court added two new 
requirements to the nature-of-the-conduct test from Varig: (1) an element 
of choice on the part of the employee70 and (2) the choice relating to a 
government policy decision.71 The Court consequently reversed the holding 
of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that the government licensing of the 
polio vaccine was discretionary, remanding the case to determine whether 
 
 64 Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added). 
 65 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 61 (1955) (emphasis added); see also id. at 76 
(Reed, J., dissenting) (“The over-all impression from the majority opinion is that it makes the 
Government liable under the [FTCA] for negligence in the conduct of any governmental activity on the 
operational level.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 66 Varig, 467 U.S. at 814 (emphasis added) (quoting Muniz, 374 U.S. at 163). 
 67 See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957). 
 68 See Varig, 467 U.S. at 821. 
 69 See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 531 (1988). 
 70 Id. at 536 (“[C]onduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or 
choice [for the employee].”). 
 71 Id. at 539 (“The discretionary function exception applies only to conduct that involves the 
permissible exercise of policy judgment.”). 
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there was an element of choice that involved public policy considerations.72 
Interestingly, under the new Berkovitz rule, the discretionary function 
exception would not apply when an employee was following specific 
orders: “In this event, the employee ha[d] no rightful option but to adhere 
to the directive.”73 This formulation closely mirrored the operational–
planning distinction from Dalehite and Indian Towing Co. without using 
that terminology. Still, the scope of the discretionary function exception 
remained unclear. 
Three years later, the Court used this mishmash of tests to immunize 
the government in the 1991 case of United States v. Gaubert,74 in which a 
shareholder of a savings and loan association sued the government, alleging 
that federal financial regulators were negligent in their duties to supervise 
corporate officers.75 The Court attempted to synthesize its precedent, 
finding that the discretionary function exception applied because the 
federal regulators exercised choice in forming public policies (satisfying 
the Berkovitz rule) and because the federal regulators were making 
“planning-level decisions” (satisfying a combination of Dalehite and 
Indian Towing Co.).76 But even while relying on this “planning-level” 
language, the Court explicitly eliminated the formal operational–planning 
distinction from Dalehite and Indian Towing Co.77 This presents a strange 
set of circumstances: The Court, in attempting to clarify the discretionary 
function exception by tearing down old distinctions, did so while still 
relying on the very language it was purporting to eliminate.78 This attempt 
at clarification further muddled the interpretation of the already vague 
discretionary function exception. 
To make matters worse, the Court added yet another wrinkle, stating 
that the “routine or frequent nature of a decision” does not foreclose 
discretionary function exception protection.79 The routine nature of an 
activity had never previously been a factor in the discretionary function 
 
 72 Id. at 548 (remanding because the Court of Appeals prematurely invoked the discretionary 
function exception). The district court originally denied the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 531. 
 73 Id. at 536. 
 74 499 U.S. 315 (1991). 
 75 Id. at 319–20. 
 76 Id. at 322–23. 
 77 See id. at 325–26 (“Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level . . . . 
There [is] no suggestion that decisions made at an operational level could not also be based on 
policy.”). 
 78 Compare id. at 323 (“[T]here is no doubt that planning-level decisions . . . are protected by the 
discretionary function exception.”), and id. at 335 (“[T]here is something to the planning vs. operational 
dichotomy.”), with id. at 325 (“Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level.”). 
 79 Id. at 334. 
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exception, unless it was in reference to the now-outdated operational-
versus-planning distinction raised in Dalehite and Indian Towing Co.80 
These new factors distracted from the central point, briefly raised in Varig, 
that the discretionary function exception protects “efficient government 
operations.”81 
The discretionary function exception had now been at least partially 
defined by such varied metrics as the employee’s status,82 the operational–
planning distinction,83 and how state law would apply,84 but these same 
metrics had been rejected as factors of a viable discretionary function test 
in Varig85 and Gaubert.86 Indeed, as the Court has admitted, judicial 
interpretations of the FTCA have failed to settle on a consistent standard.87 
III. ATTEMPTS TO STREAMLINE THE DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION EXCEPTION 
The dynamic nature of the discretionary function exception makes it 
especially difficult to properly define. Throughout its history, the 
discretionary function exception has been analyzed in a variety of 
frameworks, and scholars have offered various proposals to clarify the 
doctrine. But these analyses and proposals have been unsuccessful in two 
ways: they have failed to provide more clarity than the current test and to 
align with the Court’s most recent precedent. 
A new discretionary function test should do both things. First, there is 
no point in proposing a new framework that is plagued by the same 
ambiguities as the current discretionary function test. The doctrine will not 
benefit from more discretion. Second, considering the Court’s stubborn 
adherence to its precedent in this area, asking the Court to disregard its 
precedent entirely is unlikely to be successful. Moreover, as the FTCA 
plays an important role in controlling governmental liability, there should 
be some consistency in how it is interpreted. A good proposal should 
 
 80 For more on this distinction, see supra text accompanying notes 31–34. 
 81 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 
814 (1984) (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963)). 
 82 See supra text accompanying notes 31–34. 
 83 See supra text accompanying notes 31–34. 
 84 See supra text accompanying notes 49–51. 
 85 See supra text accompanying notes 62–66 (discussing Varig’s rejection of a status-of-the-
employee test). 
 86 See supra text accompanying notes 77–78 (explaining Gaubert’s rejection of the operational–
planning distinction). 
 87 See, e.g., United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 
467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984) (“[I]t is unnecessary—and indeed impossible—to define with precision every 
contour of the discretionary function exception.”). 
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therefore attempt to methodically synthesize the precedent. Scholarly 
analyses and proposals have failed to provide such practical guidance for 
the Court. 
A. Inability to Keep Up with the Doctrine 
Throughout the ad hoc judicial interpretation of the discretionary 
function exception described above, scholarly literature has lagged in 
efforts at analysis.88 At various points, academics have tentatively described 
the discretionary function exception, but the Court’s ever-shifting tests 
quickly mooted their analyses.89 
Eventually, many scholars eschewed trying to explain the 
discretionary function exception and instead began offering proposals to 
cure the exception’s vagueness and ambiguity.90 The proposals offered, 
however, have failed to provide greater clarity in their attempts to 
incorporate and reason through the convoluted line of judicial precedents.91 
 
 88 See, e.g., Fleming James Jr., The Federal Torts Claims Act and the “Discretionary Function” 
Exception: The Sluggish Retreat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 184 (1957) (describing 
immunity for planning-level decisions before this distinction was erased in Varig); Osborne M. 
Reynolds, Jr., The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81 
(1968) (similarly describing operational and planning activities before the distinction was erased in 
Varig). 
 89 See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325–26 (1991) (formally eliminating the 
operational–planning distinction, outdating decades of prior academic analysis on that distinction). 
 90 See, e.g., Barry R. Goldman, Note, Can the King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the 
Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 GA. L. REV. 837 (1991) 
(proposing a distinction in FTCA claims based on economic versus physical harm); Harold J. Krent, 
Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Governmental Liability in Tort, 
38 UCLA L. REV. 871, 882 (1991) (calling for a process-based test to protect independent actions taken 
by agency officials when the agency’s policies provided discretion for that official). 
 91 For example, Barry Goldman’s proposal for a distinction in FTCA claims based on economic 
versus physical harm, see supra note 90, runs contrary to at least four cases. First is Dalehite, in which 
the Court found the government’s safety procedures for storing fertilizer were discretionary, even 
though there were many deaths in the accident. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 41 (1953). Next, 
he runs into issues with Indian Towing Co., as there the Court found maintenance of a lighthouse was 
not discretionary, even though there were only economic harms. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 
350 U.S. 61, 61 (1955). Third, he faces difficulty with Rayonier, where although there were only 
economic harms, the Court left open the possibility for liability. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 
352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957). Lastly, his proposal overlooks how the Court in Varig found spot-checking 
an airplane was discretionary, even though many deaths resulted from the occurrence. Varig, 467 U.S. 
at 814. 
 Professor Krent’s proposal, see supra note 90, fares little better against the dynamic case law: A 
circuit split has formed over whether the discretionary function exception protects agency action that is 
the subject matter of policy discretion or only agency action that involves policy discretion. For 
example, after an accident occurred during the EPA’s cleanup of an abandoned chemical facility, the 
Third Circuit found the cleanup efforts were protected by the discretionary function exception because 
the entire cleanup effort was the subject matter of policy discretion. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United 
States, 837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is irrelevant whether the government employee actually 
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These failures demonstrate that even academic proposals intended to clarify 
the discretionary function exception fail to keep up with the courts’ 
dynamic interpretations of the discretionary function exception.92 The 
discretionary function exception knot has been so twisted over the years 
that it cannot be easily untangled. 
1. Plain Text State Law Standard 
The plain text of the FTCA holds the United States liable in 
circumstances where a private person “would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred.”93 One description of the discretionary function exception would 
simply follow this language: if the government would be liable for its 
actions under state law, then it is liable under the FTCA. It is unclear, 
however, how this standard would interact with the numerous other 
considerations the Court has explored. For example, the Court potentially 
endorsed this state law standard in Rayonier, when the Court held the 
government could be liable if state law would impose liability “on private 
persons or corporations under similar circumstances.”94 However, Rayonier 
did not involve other factors, such as an employee’s discretionary choice 
informed by policy considerations.95 If these other factors had been 
included, the Court could have discussed whether the state law standard is 
always controlling for application of the discretionary function exception or 
 
balanced economic, social, and political concerns in reaching his or her decision.”). By contrast, after a 
man was hit by a boat and killed while snorkeling in a lake in a state park, the Tenth Circuit found the 
Army Corps of Engineers’ decision not to warn swimmers of danger from boats was not protected by 
the discretionary function exception because there was no evidence of any policy consideration. Boyd 
v. United States, 881 F.2d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 1989) (“An alleged failure to warn swimmers of 
dangerous conditions in a popular swimming area does not implicate any social, economic, or political 
policy judgments with which the discretionary function exception properly is concerned.”). 
 92 Notably, both Goldman’s and Professor Krent’s proposals are more aligned with the recent case 
law. Goldman’s distinction between economic and physical harm followed the two most recent FTCA 
cases: in Gaubert, the Court applied the discretionary function exception to federal financial regulators 
and barred liability for purely economic harms, Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322–23, and in Berkovitz, the 
Court did not apply the discretionary function exception for the physical harm suffered by a three-
month-old boy who contracted polio from a vaccine, Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 548 
(1988). Still, Goldman’s economic-versus-physical distinction did not hold up to the older case law 
from Dalehite through Varig. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 Krent’s process-based proposal also followed Berkovitz: the Berkovitz Court had stated that if 
agency policies “allow room for implementing officials to make independent policy judgments, the 
discretionary function exception protects the acts taken by those officials in the exercise of this 
discretion.” 486 U.S. at 546. However, a succeeding circuit split in the aftermath of Berkovitz foiled 
Krent’s proposal. See supra note 91. 
 93 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 94 352 U.S. at 318. 
 95 Id. at 316 (only alleging “improper firefighting” as a cause of the damages, not an employee’s 
discretionary choice). 
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if it can be overshadowed by other factors (such as an employee’s 
discretionary choice). Thus, although the state law standard is clear on its 
face, it has not been robustly tested against other factors, and the remaining 
ambiguity surrounding this potential interplay with other factors of the 
discretionary function exception clouds any potential application. 
2. Three-Part Threshold Test 
A more complex description of the discretionary function exception 
sets forth three requirements before the exception can be applied.96 First, 
the Court must determine whether a uniquely governmental function was 
involved.97 If so, then the Court must determine whether the employee had 
a choice in the matter, instead of being instructed to act in a specified 
manner.98 Finally, the Court must determine whether the choice involved 
policy considerations, taking into account the employee’s status and the 
subject matter of the decision.99 If all of these elements are satisfied, a court 
can apply the discretionary function exception. 
This three-part threshold test seemingly complies with judicial 
precedent because it incorporates the latest discretionary function language 
from Berkovitz with its requirement that an employee makes a voluntary 
judgment call based on considerations relating to public policy.100 However, 
this test also includes elements that have been expressly rejected by the 
Supreme Court, such as the uniquely governmental function test101 and the 
employee’s status.102 The proposal assumes that the discretionary function 
exception has largely swallowed the liability rule, and it thus boldly calls 
for the Court to reconsider its prior rejection of these factors to redefine the 
discretionary function exception more strictly.103 But, as discussed above, 
the Court is unlikely to completely overturn its own precedent. This 
proposal is thus less than ideal, as it is impractical and would further 
undermine any consistency in how the FTCA is applied. 
 
 96 See Amy M. Hackman, Note, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act: How Much is Enough?, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411, 445–46 (1997). 
 97 Id. at 445–46. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 539 (1988) (“The discretionary function 
exception applies only to conduct that involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment.”). 
 101 This consideration was rejected in Indian Towing Co. See supra text accompanying notes 43–47 
(discussing the Court’s rejection of this proposed test). 
 102 And this consideration was rejected in Varig. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea 
Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984); see also supra text accompanying notes 62–
66 (discussing the Court’s break with precedent to reject this potential test). 
 103 Hackman, supra note 96, at 446. 
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3. Common Law Negligence Test 
Third, another proposal finds that the text of the discretionary function 
exception contributes little beyond common law negligence principles and 
should simply be replaced by the same, even if the text remains 
unchanged.104 This view, incidentally, aligns with the FTCA’s legislative 
history, as expressed by Assistant Attorney General Shea in 1942: the 
discretionary function exception should not provide any additional 
protection beyond what the courts already provided through common law 
negligence principles.105 
This innovative proposal’s engineer, Professor William Kratzke, 
argues that the gradual ad hoc development of the discretionary function 
exception parallels the development of common law negligence and that, in 
practice, courts do not apply the discretionary function exception when 
they feel capable of evaluating the case on grounds similar to negligence.106 
Professor Kratzke further argues that, because of its similarity to common 
law negligence, any “inconsistency” in the application of the discretionary 
function exception “should simply be accepted,” and that “[n]o more than 
that can be expected.”107 
This argument is less a proposal than an antiproposal: it is an 
argument for the status quo. While it may be tempting to “simply accept” a 
vague standard such as the discretionary function exception, such judicial 
complacence passes the responsibility of applying the discretionary 
function exception to the next judge on the bench. As previously discussed, 
this fails to address the potential for misuse of the exception. In other 
words, it supplies judges with too much discretion. Under this proposal, 
nothing would prevent a judge from expanding the exception such that it 
swallows the rule and eliminates the core purpose of the FTCA, thus 
restoring blanket sovereign immunity and rendering the hard-won FTCA 
moot.108 Or, veering in the opposite direction, a judge could virtually 
eliminate the discretionary function exception by refusing to apply it at all, 
leaving the government vulnerable to endless lawsuits from private citizens 
 
 104 See William P. Kratzke, The Convergence of the Discretionary Function Exception to the 
Federal Tort Claims Act with Limitations of Liability in Common Law Negligence, 60 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 221, 222 (1986). 
 105 See supra text accompanying note 21. 
 106 See Kratzke, supra note 104, at 286 (“Quite simply, discretion disappears when a court feels 
capable of assessing the relative values of B, P, and L.”). 
 107 Id. at 287. 
 108 The FTCA is a fragile legislative creation: it gestated in Congress for decades before it was 
finally passed, and it has never been successfully amended in its seventy-one-year existence. See 
Zillman, supra note 11. 
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and threatening essential government functions. When the stakes are this 
high, the law requires clearer guidance. 
Finally, even if Professor Kratzke is correct that courts apply the 
discretionary function exception whenever they feel capable of applying 
common law negligence principles, then the Court should at least articulate 
a factor-based standard to provide guidance for judges, such as proposed in 
this Note.109 A factor-based standard provides a broader and more 
comprehensive picture of how the discretionary function exception is 
applied. Yet, it is not overly broad: enumerated factors reign in judicial 
discretion by requiring judges to consider only those factors. 
4. Eliminating the Discretionary Function Exception 
Lastly, a more recent proposal calls for Congress to simply eliminate 
the discretionary function exception entirely, arguing that common law 
negligence principles would do a better job of defining meritorious cases 
and advocating a bar on recovery for purely economic loss as an alternative 
means to limit potential government liability.110 This argument, proposed 
by Jonathan Bruno, is based partially on empirical grounds: the government 
has enjoyed a 76.3% success rate in asserting the discretionary function 
exception post-Gaubert, even as it has invoked the exception nearly twice 
as often in the twenty-five years since Gaubert than in the forty-four years 
prior to Gaubert.111 Bruno’s concern is that the discretionary function 
exception is too broad a bar on potentially meritorious claims and that 
courts should at least evaluate a case on the merits before dismissing it via 
the discretionary function exception.112 
This proposal simply substitutes one amorphous test for another. 
Common law negligence principles are themselves vaguely defined yet do 
not include several important considerations that courts have used in 
applying the discretionary function exception to FTCA claims. For 
example, the role of agencies and mandatory regulations in many FTCA 
claims will necessarily implicate an analysis of whether the governmental 
official had a choice under the Berkovitz test.113 Further, the role of 
 
 109 Such a standard may resemble Judge Learned Hand’s formula for common law negligence. See, 
e.g., Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand Formula: A Hand that Helps or a 
Hand That Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 77 (1990) (describing how the Learned Hand formula involves a 
factor-based test of estimated cost of risks weighed against the cost to avoid the risks). 
 110 Jonathan R. Bruno, Note, Immunity for “Discretionary” Functions: A Proposal to Amend the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 414–15 (2012). 
 111 See id. at 430. 
 112 See id. at 414 (“The discretionary function exception is largely redundant because most of the 
claims it now bars would ultimately fail on the merits, even absent immunity.”). 
 113 See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (introducing choice-of-employee 
language). 
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government as a party to FTCA suits implicates concerns over separation 
of powers and protecting government’s core functions; indeed, these 
concerns can be traced back to the legislative history of the original 
statute.114 The concepts of common law negligence are simply not equipped 
to resolve these thorny issues. 
Moreover, for reasons previously discussed, a bar on purely economic 
loss will not comport with existing precedent.115 This murky legal concept 
has so far not featured in the Court’s interpretation of the discretionary 
function exception—nor should it, as the exception is best clarified by 
streamlining prior precedent into factors. 
IV. A FACTOR-BASED STANDARD FOR THE DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION EXCEPTION 
The above analyses highlight the dilemma with the discretionary 
function exception: it is too multifaceted to be resolved by a simple 
proposal but too restricted by its own precedent to allow much room for 
creativity in more complex proposals. Therefore, the best way to clarify the 
discretionary function exception is not to add additional factors or to 
resurrect eliminated distinctions; rather, the courts should simply and 
clearly articulate the core guiding principles that the Court has been 
implicitly relying on. These guiding principles date back to the FTCA’s 
legislative history116 and have surfaced in the precedent as well.117 
Articulating these principles in the form of a factor-based standard is the 
superior approach, as it would eliminate confusion by cleanly breaking 
with contradictory precedent and elucidating the practical and policy 
concerns underlying the FTCA’s application. 
A. Why Factors Are Necessary 
A factor-based standard allows courts to simultaneously cabin and 
preserve the discretionary function exception, fulfilling two primary 
purposes of the FTCA: allowing citizens to sue the government and 
protecting the government’s vital operations from endless private litigation. 
Such a factor-based standard provides much-needed judicial guidance. 
 
 114 See supra Part I. 
 115 See supra note 91. 
 116 See supra Part I. 
 117 For example, the Court in Varig balanced the concern with judicial second-guessing of 
legislative policy-related decisions, the desire to protect efficient government operations, and the 
legislative intent to hold the government accountable for negligence. See supra text accompanying 
notes 61–66. 
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Without a factor-based standard, mixed judicial language creates 
uncertainty in how the discretionary function exception should be applied. 
For instance, language from past holdings has resurfaced in later 
cases. In Gaubert, to take one example, the Court found that federal 
regulators were making “planning-level decisions” in justifying the 
application of the discretionary function exception,118 resuscitating the 
operational–planning distinction from Dalehite.119 However, later in the 
same opinion, the Court appeared to end the operational–planning 
distinction, finding that “[d]iscretionary conduct is not confined to the 
policy or planning level . . . . There [is] no suggestion that decisions made 
at an operational level could not also be based on policy.”120 A factor-based 
standard clears up this confusion by providing relevant considerations 
while deliberately omitting irrelevant factors. In turn, this will allay 
concerns about the amount of discretion involved in applying the 
discretionary function exception. 
The need for a factor-based test is especially relevant and pressing 
today because there have been recent developments hinting at the 
possibility of applying the FTCA to private litigation of foreign 
governments, in addition to the federal government. For example, Congress 
in 2016 voted to override President Barack Obama’s veto in passing a 9/11 
Victims Bill, which allowed private citizens to directly sue the Saudi 
Arabian government, or any other foreign government, in federal court for 
any role played in deadly terrorist attacks on American soil.121 As the 
FTCA increases in importance and scope, the need for clearer doctrine 
grows. 
B. The Excluded Factors 
In creating a factor-based test, some factors should be excluded, 
including at least three factors that have been explicitly ruled out by prior 
FTCA precedent. First, the “uniquely governmental function” test was 
rejected in Indian Towing Co. and Rayonier,122 so no matter what kind of 
conduct the government is performing, it can be the basis of an FTCA 
claim if the other requirements are met. Second, the “status of the 
 
 118 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991). 
 119 See supra text accompanying notes 31–34 (discussing this distinction). 
 120 Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325–26. 
 121 See Jennifer Steinhauer et al., Congress Votes to Override Obama Veto on 9/11 Victims Bill, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/us/politics/senate-votes-to-override-
obama-veto-on-9-11-victims-bill.html [https://perma.cc/WV4N-B2VH]. 
 122 See supra text accompanying notes 43–47, 51 (discussing the Court’s rejection of this test). 
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employee” consideration was eliminated in Varig,123 so the rank of the 
relevant government employee responsible for the alleged negligence is 
immaterial, unless it relates to another factor.124 Finally, the operational–
planning distinction was eliminated in Gaubert,125 so the level of 
decisionmaking is also immaterial, unless it is relevant for another factor.126 
These factors: the uniquely governmental function test, the status-of-the-
employee test, and the operational–planning test, have been left behind in 
the ever-changing judicial interpretation of the FTCA and should be retired 
for good. Omitting these outdated factors will clear up any confusion as to 
their relevance. 
C. The Proposed Factors 
This Note proposes a test with three primary factors: (1) whether the 
government employee exercised a choice, (2) whether the choice related to 
policy considerations, and (3) whether the government employee’s 
conduct, if performed by a private person, would violate state law. In 
addition to these primary factors, courts must consider two other important 
concerns under this proposed test: (1) practical concerns over inhibiting 
essential government functioning127 and (2) a desire to minimize sovereign 
immunity and allow private citizens to sue the government for wrongful or 
negligent acts by its agents, officers, or employees.128 
1. Whether the Government Employee Exercised a Choice 
The first factor is whether the government employee exercised a 
choice, which stems from the similar Berkovitz requirement that the 
relevant government employee had a choice in the allegedly negligent act 
or omission.129 While this requirement is broad, it interprets the word 
“discretionary” by focusing on whether the employee had any discretion. 
For example, an employee who was simply following orders would not be 
 
 123 See supra text accompanying notes 62–66 (discussing Varig’s rejection of such a test). 
 124 For example, it could relate to whether there was a choice relating to a policy consideration, or 
if the employee was simply following orders without a choice. See infra Section IV.C.1 for additional 
information on that proposed factor. 
 125 See supra text accompanying notes 76–78 (discussing Gaubert’s rejection of this distinction). 
 126 Like the status of the employee, see supra note 124, it may be relevant for whether there was a 
choice relating to a policy consideration, which this Note proposes as a factor in Section IV.C.1, infra. 
 127 This has its roots in the FTCA’s legislative history. See supra Part I. 
 128 This was the desire that led to the FTCA’s passage in the first place. See supra Part I. 
 129 See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (“[C]onduct cannot be discretionary 
unless it involves an element of judgment or choice [for the employee].”). 
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protected under the discretionary function exception because the employee 
lacked any discretion.130 
One concern with adopting this factor is that if the courts strictly apply 
the choice requirement, it will incentivize government bureaucracies to 
provide less guidance, and potentially regulations, for their employees 
because fewer directives will mean less potential liability. For example, if 
enforcement was left to the discretion of individual employees due to lack 
of any concrete guidelines in enforcing statutes and regulations, then the 
government would never be liable because there would always be a 
discretionary act. However, this fear is unfounded for three reasons. 
First, the government does not decide on policy as a means of 
avoiding liability—government functions to help resolve collective action 
problems.131 So the government will not shirk enforcement of regulations 
merely to avoid liability if the regulations help play a role in government 
functioning. Second, while annual statistics of FTCA claims are not 
published, FTCA payouts are constrained by a prohibition on punitive 
damages and a reluctance to certify class actions.132 Thus, the potential 
liability from the FTCA will not prevent government from functioning. 
Third, even if the government were to provide employees with less 
guidance in response to the choice requirement, the costs and benefits of 
regulation are far from clear; it would be misleading to characterize all 
deregulation as having a negative outcome.133 
Thus, incorporating the Berkovitz choice requirement will do 
nothing more than align the discretionary function exception with 
existing precedent; fear of unintended consequences should not 
outweigh the judiciary’s duty to clarify the scope of the law. 
2. Whether the Choice Is Related to Policy Considerations 
The second proposed factor is the nature of the choice; the employee’s 
choice must be related to policy considerations.134 These policy 
 
 130 This also clarifies that the status of the employee is not independently relevant, especially in 
light of Varig’s rejection of that consideration. See supra text accompanying notes 62–66. 
 131 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115 (2010). 
 132 See Donald N. Zillman, Presenting a Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 43 LA. L. REV. 
961, 980 & n.124 (1983). 
 133 See Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and 
Synthesis, 8 YALE J. REG. 233, 233 (1991) (finding there are large efficiency costs from economic 
regulation). 
 134 This is based on the Court’s analysis in Berkovitz. See 486 U.S. at 539; see also supra text 
accompanying note 72. 
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considerations could be social, economic, or political in nature, as 
described in Varig.135 
While this is another broad requirement, it tethers the employee’s 
choice to a broader system, which functionally excludes individual 
employee decisions not reflective of the larger organization. For example, 
an employee who chooses not to do his job would not be protected under 
the discretionary function exception, because refusing to do one’s job is not 
a policy-related decision. On the other hand, an employee deciding how to 
allocate sparse resources in performance of his job-related duties could be 
protected by the discretionary function exception because the resource-
allocation decision would necessarily pertain to social, economic, or 
political considerations. Thus, the government is protected when its 
employees make decisions while completing their job-related duties, which 
preserves government functioning. 
But the government can still be vicariously liable for the actions of 
rogue employees who act beyond the parameters of their job description—
those choices are not policy related and thus are not protected by the 
discretionary function exception. This mirrors existing negligence law,136 
which is in the spirit of the FTCA, as it allows citizens to hold the 
government liable as citizens could do with a private party.137 The policy-
related choice requirement would therefore balance the competing concerns 
behind the FTCA: it would ensure that the government is liable for 
stepping beyond the line of its official duties while protecting essential 
government operations. 
3. Whether the Government’s Conduct Violated Any State Law 
As reflected in the FTCA,138 and as discussed in Rayonier,139 the third 
proposed factor considers the existence of any state law violations resulting 
from the conduct of the federal government. If the employee’s conduct 
violates state law in a manner such that a “private person” would be liable 
 
 135 See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 
797, 814 (1984) (“Congress wished to prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and 
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an 
action in tort.”). 
 136 See, e.g., Butler v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 1150, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (affirming that a 
school’s allocation of teachers in supervising rowdy students could not be considered negligent). 
 137 As previously noted, the FTCA aims to hold government liable “in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012). 
 138 See id. § 1346(b)(1) (holding the government liable where its actions, if taken by “a private 
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or 
omission occurred”). 
 139 See supra text accompanying notes 49–50 (discussing the Rayonier Court’s consideration of 
this factor). 
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for that conduct, that alone would be sufficient for an FTCA claim. This 
factor is fairly straightforward and consistent with precedent, such as 
Rayonier.140 
4. Protecting Government Functioning vs. Minimizing 
Sovereign Immunity 
The factor-based standard must also consider the policy guidelines 
underlying the FTCA. Two guidelines can be discerned from the FTCA’s 
legislative history: (1) practical concerns over inhibiting essential 
government functioning, as balanced against (2) the desire to minimize 
sovereign immunity and allow private citizens to sue the government for 
wrongful or negligent acts by its agents, officers, or employees.141 
On top of the delineated factors, these concerns should play a role in 
any application of the FTCA: to what extent will government liability 
impair essential government functioning? If liability will not cripple the 
government’s essential functioning and the other FTCA elements are met, 
then the discretionary function exception should not protect the government 
because the entire purpose of the FTCA was to pull back the curtain of 
sovereign immunity as long as it did not impair essential government 
functioning. 
 
*          *          * 
 
Thus, this proposed standard for the discretionary function exception 
has three factors: (1) whether the government employee exercised a choice, 
(2) whether that choice related to policy considerations, and (3) whether the 
government’s conduct violated any state law. Concerns such as the status 
of the actor, whether the conduct was operational or planning in nature, and 
whether the conduct was governmental conduct are all irrelevant unless 
they speak to any of the three relevant factors. Additionally, this test 
balances potential deleterious effects on proper governmental functioning 
with the goal of deterring governmental negligence and restoring private 
parties who were injured by such negligence. Most importantly, the closed-
ended, factor-based standard proposed here will prevent future judicial 
interpretation from adding unworkable and contradictory factors to the 
discretionary function exception. In this way, it will simultaneously cabin 
and preserve both the exception and the FTCA at large. 
 
 140  See supra text accompanying notes 49–50. 
 141 See supra Part I (discussing these concerns as related to the passage of the FTCA). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court may be understandably reluctant to employ a factor-based 
standard for the discretionary function exception, hoping that Congress will 
instead clarify the scope of the exception through an amendment to the 
statutory text. But this wait-and-see approach is misguided. First, Congress 
has neglected to update the language of the discretionary function 
exception for the past seventy years, and there is no sign Congress plans to 
revisit the statute. Second, this congressional silence could potentially be 
interpreted as legislative approval of the judicial interpretation of the 
discretionary function exception. A factor-based standard aligned with 
existing case law would solidify this implicitly approved judicial 
interpretation without adding anything new. Third, a factor-based test 
would place limits on future judicial interpretation of the discretionary 
function exception; such limits are needed to prevent the government from 
being over- or underexposed to liability under the FTCA. Fourth, the FTCA 
will only grow in importance with an expanding government bureaucracy 
and an increasingly complex society, so this problem must be dealt with 
sooner rather than later. Finally, the potential for the FTCA to be applied to 
foreign governments, in addition to the United States government, only 
raises the stakes for the discretionary function exception: a clearer rule will 
increase predictability in foreign affairs by setting firmer limits on potential 
liability. Without this predictability, the United States risks alienating 
important allies and undermining the broader concept of diplomatic 
immunity. For these reasons, the Court should adopt the factor-based 
standard proposed in this Note. 
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